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Where do we draw the line between what is and is not a 
work of art? And, how are we to distinguish between so 
called •good• and "bad" works of art? There is a tendency 
to blur the distinction between these questions because 
they seem, in certain senses, to be inextricably bound to 
one another. It is not uncommon, for instance, to hear 
someone praise something by referring to it as a •work of 
art,• yet most of us agree that not all works of art are 
•good," even in the aesthetic sense. Too often this distinction 
is muddled by the language of the layman. My intent here 
is to explore the second matter, as to whether or not there 
is any objectivity in the evaluation of artistic merit. 
However, this task will eventually call into play some 
consideration of the prior matter, as to the definition of 
art. 
In dealing with the matter of objectivity in the 
aesthetic judgement, I shall first talk about the relation 
between qualities of the artwork, e.g. balance, form, 
•spirit of joy,• soothingness, and the standards for the 
aesthetic judgement. I shall also discuss some parallels 
between the ways in which we evaluate things such as tools 
and the ways in which we might go about the evaluation of 
art. Later in the paper, I shall discuss in detail the 
aesthetic experience and its relation to the making of 
aesthetic judgements. 
A judgement which is wholly susceptible to objectivity 
is one which either does or does not correspond to some accepted 
definition or criterion of truth or value. For example, 
one might say that a judgement concerning the quality of 
one drill over another is purely objective in that both 
drills can be measured against an acceoted criterion 
namely, the of usefulness for the drilling of holes. 
Whichever drill corresponds most closely to a desired 
degree of usefulness is the best. Aesthetic theory need 
not be so optimistic as to hope for such a level of objectivity. 
What level of objectivity must be reached if we are to 
distinguish between good and bad works of art? Are we 
attempting to formulate a theory which will accomodate 
such claims as, "this piece of art is definitely good, but 
this one is even better?" Or, are we going to be content 
to merely distinguish the good works from the bad ones? At 
this point, we cannot determine exactly what it is that 
aesthetic theory will or might eventually allow us to do; 
however, I do not expect it to enable us to evaluate the 
aesthetic merits of all works of art. We may be asking 
too much of aesthetic theory if we expect it to accomodate 
such claims as, "this work is good, but this one is even 
better.• Most of us would be quite content to have access 
to an aesthetic theory which could accomodate the following 
claim: "These works are clearly good, those are clearly 
bad, and these over here are simply indeterminable." 
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What counts is that it can differentiate the good and the 
bad. Whether or not aesthetic theory is capable of this, 
much less anything more, remains to be seen. 
In an attempt to locate criteria for evaluation of art 
we shall find that there is an important distinction to be 
made between qualities of the work of art and the aesthetic 
response of the observer. I have in mind such qualities as 
balance, subject matter, and so on. Inasmuch as both 
seem to be related to evaluative criteria, it is difficult 
to decide which is of the most significance. If the qualities 
or properties of a particular work of art are deemed •good," 
is there a guarantee that the related aesthetic response is 
a "good" one? Or, are we to deny the possibility that a 
praiseworthy aesthetic response can be elicited by an 
artwork which has unpraiseworthy qualities? In view of the 
problems fostered by this distinction, one is tempted to 
seek out support for the argument that the qualities 
present in a work of art are always directly related to the 
quality of the aest~etic response. In many senses this may 
well be the case, but such an argument necessarily denies 
the possibility that the same artwork may elicit a variety 
of responses (even within the same individual at different 
occasions). As one who is at present seeking objectivity, 
I am attracted by the idea of avoiding a serious consideration 
of the aesthetic response, for qualities of the artwork 
are much more tangible. However, we cannot ignore the fact 
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that the aesthetic judgement cannot be made before the 
event of the aesthetic response. That is, the judgement is 
made during or after the initial response. In addition, it 
seems that any criteria which are chosen for the evaluation 
of qualities present in the work of art are given their 
meaning, at least partly, in terms of what we consider, in 
some sense, to be valuable in the aesthetic response. 
This preceding notion raises another distinction, that 
of the pre-critical and critical response. There are many 
senses in which we can speak of the aesthetic response, 
thus we must be careful to explicate any sense in which it 
is referred to. The pre-critical response might be thought 
of as a •gut reaction,• whereas the critical response is 
something which involves a process of reasoning in some 
degree. Thus, if we are to make any sense of what it is 
that is valuable in the aesthetic response, we must speak 
in terms of a specified context of the aesthetic response. 
I shall expand upon this notion further on. 
If the aesthetic response can be separated from the 
qualities of the artwork itself, and discussed as a significant 
influence on evaluative judgements, there is a problem 
which immediately arises. It seems that the perception of 
an artwork from the individual point of view is influenced 
by the individual's knowledge, education, social status, 
and a host of other factors. For the observer brings something 
with him to the event of perceiving the work of art. At 
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a general level, one might want to say that an individual's 
perception of a work of art is influenced or even framed by 
the structures of the culture through which he sees. In 
the same vein and at a more specific level, a particular 
individual's experience of a work of art is affected by how 
much and what aspects of his culture he has absorbed and 
brought with him to the experience. Even the aging process 
and all the possible considerations associated with it may 
affect the individual's experience of the artwork, and there-
with the aesthetic response. More specifically, it may 
be the case that we can make sense of a position which 
holds that there is an individual development or change of 
taste, even one which is a function of age, and which is somehow 
independent of social acculturation. However, I do not 
wish to argue for such a position here. 
If there is an important link between the aesthetic 
judgement and the aesthetic response, and if the aesthetic 
response is affected by social and individual factors which 
influence the individual's experience of an artwork, what 
then, are we to say about arguments which suggest that an 
individual's social status, age, and education are important 
factors in the determination of the validity .2!_ aesthetic 
judgements? In particular, it is often taken for granted 
that the judgement made by the well educated patron of the 
arts is somehow more significant or more worthy of serious 
consideration than the judgement made by someone unfamiliar 
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with much art. Is there any truth in such claims? Is the 
seventh grader's evaluation any less credible than the one 
made by the professor of art history? Whether or not there 
is an arguable position here is not of concern at the moment, 
for to approach our problem in this manner is misleading. 
It may be the case that the art-educated are more often in 
a position to make valid judgements about the merits of 
artworks than those who are not. What counts, however, is 
whether or not those who make evaluations have access to 
the kind of reasoning or justification which we hope to 
find valid in the end. We have to focus on the process 
of reasoning without regard for its origin. 
Is-it possible to evaluate something in terms of merit 
without having any reasons whatsoever to support the evaluation? 
If someone is asked, •why do you like the taste of broccoli?•, 
and their reply is, •I can't explain it, I just like the 
taste of broccoli,• are we to suppose that there are no 
supporting reasons simply because they cannot be articulated? 
I think not. There is a distinction which must be drawn 
between an unarticulated reason and an articulated reason. 
A judgement supported by reasons which cannot or will not 
be articulated is doomed to remain a matter of individual 
taste or opinion, but an articulable reason is extensible 
to the realm of collective consensus or evaluation. If we 
are to find objectivity in the aesthetic judgement, we 
must have access to articulable reasons. At this point, 
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we might consider what is involved in the distinction 
between the kinds of reasons which aim at explaining "why I 
think something to be good," and the kinds which aim at 
explaining "why you should think it to be good too." That 
is, there is a difference between explicating the causes of 
an aesthetic judgement and arguing for the validity of an 
aesthetic judgement. 
The distinction here bears a likeness to the distinction 
which Monroe Beardsley makes between what is and what is 
not a genuine dispute. According to Beardsley, two people 
who are in disagreement about the merits of a particular 
thing but do not have any reasons with which to explain 
their positions are not engaged in a dispute, but merely a 
"contradiction." A dispute comes about when two parties who 
are in disagreement give reasons for their positions. 1 
There is a problem with this suggestion which results from 
the fact that Beardsley does not attempt to define the 
specific character of the reasons which justify each position. 
If the reasons offered by both parties aim at some kind of 
emotive meaning, that is if the reasons merely explain 
why a particular individual has made a positive judgement 
and not why other individuals should or ought to pass the 
same judgement, then there is only disagreement and not a 
dispute. Disagreement may be a necessary condition for the 
existence of a dispute, but it is not a sufficient one. My 
point is simply that we must keep in mind the knowledge 
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that there are different kinds of disagreements; Some are 
based upon attitudes and others upon beliefs, some are 
genuine disputes and some are not. If we are to find 
objectivity in the aesthetic judgement, we need not only to 
have access to articulable reasons, but also to reasons 
which do more than simply explain a judgement, i.e. why it 
is made -- in short, give the causes of a judgement. 
We must have access to reasons which aim at persuading and 
arguing "for" a particular position. 
When two parties are engaged in a dispute over the 
merits of a work of art, how are we to decide which reasons 
are more relevant or valid as grounds for an aesthetic 
judgement? How are we to distinguish valid reasons from 
the ones which might be too weak, subjective, or irrevelant? 
It seems that we might begin by attempting to locate some 
standard(s) by which the validity of the reasons can be 
measured. To the contrary, I shall approach this matter 
with an attempt at a process of elimination. That is, I 
shall first consider what kinds of standards are not able 
to serve as valid grounds for aesthetic judgements. The 
understanding of what something is not may in some way 
facilitate or contribute to an understanding of what something 
is. 
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I. QUALITIES OF THE WORK OF ART IN RELATION TO AESTHETIC 
JUDGEMENTS 
Suppose that we are offered the following argument: Van 
Gogh's "A Starry Night• is a good painting (in an aesthetic 
sense) because its colors are well balanced and vigorous, 
and because the overall impression which it offers is 
soothing, mystical, and dream-like. Now, the first point 
we might consider is that we are offered five reasons in 
support of the judgement, however similar they might appear. 
Which, if any, of these reasons might be linked to a valid 
standard for an aesthetic judgement? I do not claim to 
have the answer at hand, but this example of an argument 
serves well to illustrate an important point which must be 
considered. If a valid aesthetic judgement is to rely, in 
some degree, upon the qualities of the work of art, then it 
must be shown that the qualities focused upon by the reasons 
correspond to the work descriptively. For example, if I 
state that Van Gough's "A Starry Night" is a good work of 
art because it is soothing (assuming that •soothing• has 
been determined as a criterion of aesthetic excellence), 
then I remain to face the problem of proving that the 
painting does or can indeed elicit a soothing response. 
However, I do not believe that the problem in general of 
proving that a work of art possesses certain qualities is 
as formidable a task as the problem of locating the criterion 
of excellence. The underlying point here is this: If we 
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are to refer to qualities of the work of art in making an 
aesthetic judgement, we must be able to describe or define 
these qualities or properties in such a way that our meaning 
is clear and specific. If a term such as "mystical" is to 
be discussed as a quality of an artwork which has something 
to do with its aesthetic evaluation, we must be careful to 
explicate what it is that we mean by •mystical." We may 
find that certain descriptions or terms are far too vague 
or general in meaning to serve as adequate considerations 
in aesthetic judgements. 
What sorts of descriptions of works of art might be 
said to have nothing to do with aesthetic merit? Obviously, 
descriptions such as "large,• "rectangular,• or "in the key 
of A," have nothing to do with aesthetic merit. We must 
pay attention to those descriptions which seem as if they 
might have something to do with aesthetic merit, but which 
may not. Careful consideration must be given to descriptions 
such as "well-balanced" or •harmonious• for, although they 
are often used by critics as counting towards a positive 
appraisal, their merit-making value as they apply to a work 
of art is not universally agreed upon. Balance and harmony 
may be appealing qualities in a work of art to many people, 
yet many others may be indifferent or even "turned off" by 
such qualities since they are prevalent in so many of the 
objects around us, at least in the case of balance. If a 
quality such as "balance• is to count towards the aesthetic 
- 10 -
merit of a work of art, it may not matter that there will 
be some people who will prefer that it count against the 
merit of a work: what matters is that the reasons which 
support the claim are well justified in some manner. 
Monroe Beardsley suggests that if a reason is to properly 
support an aesthetic evaluation, that is if a reason is to 
be relevant, it must be centered around a description of 
the artwork itself. In addition, the reason must both 
support the value judgement and explain why the judgement 
is true. Beardsley also suggests that reasons which center 
around the antecedent conditions of the work, •about the 
intentions of the artist, or his sincerity, or his originality, 
or the social conditions of the work,• are not relevant 
critical reasons because they do not explain •directly• why 
the work is good. Beardsley excludes from the class of 
relevant critical reasons those which aim at the effect of 
the artwork upon individuals or groups, descriptions such 
as •morally uplifting, or shocking, or popular at the box 
office.•2 
One problem here is that Beardsley does not explain exactly 
how it is that descriptions or interpretations of the artwork 
(itself) directly explain why the work is good. It is not 
so much that I wish to criticize Beardsley on this point, 
but his suggestion leaves us begging for an explanation. 
According to Beardsley, relevant critical reasons, those 
which properly support an aesthetic judgement, appeal to 
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three general criteria which he claims to adequately cover 
the range of general descriptions. These are "unity, 
complexity, and intensity of regional quality.• I do not 
wish to embark upon a full-scale explanation of these 
terms, but would like to briefly consider his term "regional 
quality.• This category of descriptions includes terms 
such as •spirit of joy.• How is it that such a quality can 
be used as a criterion of excellence, as a quality which 
counts towards the merit of a work of art? It is true that 
•joy• usually carries with it connotations of positiveness 
or goodness, but this fact alone surely cannot justify the 
validity of the use of the term as a criterion of excellence. 
Such a justification is no more valid than is a justification 
by an appeal to authority. The term "spirit of joy" becomes 
even more problematic (as a criterion of excellence) when 
it is realized that its meaning may lack a certain specifity, 
a certain preciseness. Moreover, to speak about an artwork 
in terms of a quality such as "spirit of joy" may say 
as much about what it is not as what it actually is. For 
example, to say that a painting has a "spirit of joy" may 
imply that the painting does not have a spirit of all those 
things which we consider to be the opposite of joy such as 
"misery,• "unhappiness,• perhaps even •hopelessness.• 
This, in turn, raises the question of whether or not such 
terms might serve adequately as negative criticism of a 
given artwork. 
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I am not as comfortable as Beardsley in ruling out all 
of the antecedent conditions of the work of art as relevant 
critical reasons. In particular, the fact that he rejects 
the intentions of the artist as relevant is somewhat bothersome, 
though I do not intend to consider this problem here. I 
use the word •somewhat• because there is an appeal for the 
idea, as another philosopher once phrased it, •rt is always 
what is done that we have to judge, not what the artist 
intended, but perhaps failed to do.• 3 Moreover, on the 
other hand, it is rather disturbing that Beardsley dismisses 
as irrelevant the "social conditions of the work of art.• 
Now, he does not explicate what it is that this may refer 
to, but there are many considerations having to do with 
what we might generally term "social conditions of the work 
of art• which may be relevant to the aesthetic judgement. 
For example, the meanings associated with terms such as 
"spirit of joy" may change according to the social conditions 
within which the work is present. A Greek bacchanal is not 
a Christian good deed. Even the meaning of the term, •beauty,• 
and not merely the standards for employing it, is dependent, 
in certain senses, upon the social and cultural framework 
in which it is applied. To cite a rather crude example, it 
is well kown that in past eras the stereotypical female beauty 
was by today's standards rather overweight and unpleasing. 
Today, of course, the media has helped to depict her as 
slim. If, for example, a modern painting of a slim, nude 
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woman were presented within this distant culture of plumpness 
appreciators (and let us say that the degree of representation 
and so forth is consistent with their acceptance), in all 
likelihood the painting would be less beautiful, or have 
no beauty at all, and so of less aesthetic value to the 
extent that the capturing of the beauty of the female body 
were a significant measure of excellence. It appears to be 
the case that our culture, the media, the educational 
system, and so on, influences and even determines many of our 
preferences and values. The question is whether they also 
help justify our aesthetic judgements, and not merely our 
preferences and values. 
It may be the case that the social conditions surrounding 
a given work of art cannot be appealed to in such a way as 
to directly justify a value claim, but they might serve to 
justify whatever it is that justifies the value claim. 
That is, the cultural setting for the work of art serves as 
the grounds for the standards {themselves) which we appeal 
to in the evaluation of art. The critical reasons Beardsley 
takes to be relevant appeal to standards which are relative 
to and given meaning by the culture and era in which they 
exist. Perhaps Beardsley would reply to this by suggesting 
that to consider social conditions of the work of art as I 
have is to confuse causes with reasons, that social conditions 
may in some way account for the existence of certain judgements 
but not in any way support the reasons for the aesthetic 
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judgement. However, I am not confusing causes with reasons. 
My position is that social conditions do serve as reasons 
for judgements, but as standards, or reasons for standards, 
which specify what facts or conditions are relevant reasons 
for aesthetic judgements. 
The last point I wish to consider concerning Beardsley 
is that he has deemed it fallacious to evaluate a work of 
art in terms of its effect upon the observer; such approaches 
are said to suffer from the •affective fallacy.• We must 
first shed some light on this consideration by drawing a 
distinction between a "pro-response• and an "aesthetic-
response. • The •pro-response• includes such things as 
"popular at the box office.• Recall my earlier distinction 
betwween the •pre-critical• and •critical response.• The 
•pro-response• is akin to the •pre-critical• response in 
that it may be thought of as a sort of "gut reaction;• 
it determines the general attitude towards something, a 
work of art is either liked or it is not. The •aesthetic-
response, • on the other hand, may be influenced by the •gut 
reaction• but is somehow attuned to many other levels of 
appreciation and experience. Beardsley may be safe in 
suggesting that the •pro-response• is not a relevant 
consideration in the aesthetic judgement, but he may not 
be safe if he means to include those responses which might 
fall under the category of •aesthetic.• Now, he claims that 
descriptions such as •morally uplifting, or shocking, or 
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popular at the box office" are not relevant reasons because 
they do not •say what in the work makes it good,• but 
themselves have to be explained by "what is in the work 
(which is shocking because of the nudity or the sadism or 
whatever) ••• • 4 There is little point in arguing that 
"morally uplifting• or "shocking• are •aesthetic-responses" 
as I have defined them, but if what counts against such 
responses as relevant reasons for aesthetic judgements is 
that they do not explain what •in the work" makes it good, 
then it stands to reason that the •aesthetic-response" must 
also be ruled out since it does not explain what •in the 
work• makes it good. Indeed, all responses must be ruled 
out since responses are by nature distinct from descriptions 
of or qualities in a work of art. Thus, we may read Beardsley 
as suggesting that an appeal to aesthetic experience is an 
irrevelant consideration in the making of aesthetic judgements 
since aesthetic experience is a response of some sort. 
This is even more clearly the case when he states that •the 
only way to support such a judgement [here he means a 
judgement concerning aesthetic value] relevantly and cogently 
would be to point out features of the work that enable it to 
provide an experience having an esthetic character.•5 
This last statement might appear to some as being somehow 
intuitively plausible, but there is something very disturbing 
about it. For, I agree with Beardsley's position that "the 
aesthetic value of an object is that value which it possesses 
- 16 -
in virtue of its capacity to provide esthetic experience. 
However, if this is the case, why is it that we may appeal 
only to features or descriptions of the artwork in the 
making of aesthetic judgements? If the aesthetic experience 
is what counts in deciding upon the aesthetic value of an 
object, may we not appeal to aesthetic experience or response 
as well? The reason for my suggestion that Beardsley's 
claim (above) might appear to be intuitively plausible is 
that the qualities or features of the work of art are 
responsible for the justification of the merit of the 
related aesthetic experience. In other words, the aesthetic 
experience of which we speak exists as a reaction or response 
to the artwork, and more specifically, qualities of the 
artwork. Though we would not want to say that the aesthetic 
experience is a reaction to any particular quality of the 
artwork, we would want to say that it is a reaction or to a 
complex relationship of qualities. What is disturbing 
about Beardsley's claim I shall attempt to make clear in 
the following. 
We may draw a distinction between the idea of a •response• 
and the idea of a •reaction• in terms of the aesthetic 
experience. For the sake of argument, let us say that an 
aesthetic •response• to a particular work of art is a 
response which is consistent and in a manner predictable in 
the sense that the quality or character of the response is 
the same regardless of who (special circumstances aside) is 
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having the response. In this sense, we might say that 
an artwork (which is composed of a complex relationship of 
qualities) always affords for all observers a common aesthetic 
response. Now, let us say that an aesthetic •reaction• to 
a particular work of art is a response which is not consistent 
or predictable. In this case, we might say that the artwork 
has functioned as the catalyst for the response, as the 
initial cause of the reaction, but that the observer has in 
some sense contributed something of his own to the experience. 
The artwork is not solely responsible for the quality of 
the aesthetic experience in this case, for the observer has 
allowed his own imagination, memories, or something from 
within himself to influence the experience. 
If Beardsley would claim that all aesthetic experiences 
are of the aesthetic •response• variety as I have defined 
them, then he is quite right in suggesting that the only 
way to support an aesthetic judgement is to refer to features 
and qualities of the artwork. However, few of us, if any, 
would want to claim that all or even most aesthetic experiences 
are of the •response• variety. It is often the case that 
different individuals are influenced differently by the 
same thing, especially when that thing is a work of art. 
My point is not that it is in any way useless, much less 
wrong, to refer to the artwork in the making of aesthetic 
judgements, but that in many cases it may be just as useful 
or even necessary that we refer to qualities and characters 
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of the aesthetic experience. Beardsley might reply to my 
suggestion with the idea that whatever it is that the 
observer somehow adds to the experience does not in any way 
effect the aesthetic value of the artwork since it has 
nothing to do with it. This is plausible. However, we may 
reply that the aesthetic value of an artwork may have 
something to do with the potential for inducing or influencing 
a variety of aesthetic experiences, or that what the individual 
•adds" to the aesthetic experience does effect the aesthetic 
value of the artwork since whatever it is that he •adds,• 
however personal or unique, is influenced by the artwork. 
In any case, it would seem to be unwise on our part to 
ignore the possibility that the aesthetic experience may be 
used as justification for aesthetic judgements in all cases. 
In the appreciation and evaluation of art there is an 
intuitive factor: this, obviously, is what we are fighting 
to either understand or overcome. It is difficult for us 
to explain why we appreciate or approve of certain works of 
art, even to ourselves. But it is a mistake, I think, for 
us to assume that the intuitive factor cannot be subject to 
objective analysis. Thus far, we have been attempting to 
analyze the descrf:Qtions of the aesthetic object and the 
responses or reactions to the object in terms of evaluative 
criteria. In doing this, we may be trying too hard to find 
some direct relationship between the work of art and the 
standards by which it should be judged. We might do better 
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to place more emphasis on the consideration that the 
interpretation of the work of art and the standards by 
which we judge the work of art are given meaning partly by 
the socio-cultural setting of which they are a part. As I 
have already suggested, there may be some sense in the idea 
that the social conditions of the artwork may serve as 
grounds for the standards which we appeal to in the evaluation 
of art. Consider the statement by Marx, nThe mode of 
production of material life conditions the general character 
of the social, political and spiritual processes of life.n 
Art is part of these spiritual processes. Inasmuch as the 
mode or production of material life may be said to condition 
the economic and social structures of society, we may say 
that art and how we perceive it is conditioned by social 
and economic structures. In keeping with this line of 
thought, there are many philosophers who hold that an 
artwork can be fully understood and/or appreciated only 
when it is seen as being integrated with a particular set 
of cultural situations, either past or present as the case 
may be. It may turn out to be the case that the analysis 
of our intuitive insight into the evaluation of art will be 
facilitated by the understanding of how our intuition is 
subject to the same social and economic conditioning. 
In considering the intuitive evaluation, we face the 
problem of whether or not one person's intuition in the 
evaluation of art is any more valid than another's. However, 
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the task of evaluating the validity of intuition may be 
somewhat less formidable if we attempt to understand it as 
the product of social forces. The majority of Americans 
place a high value on the attainment of wealth and property. 
Are we to believe that it is simply a coincidence that so 
many people share the same values? I think not. Social 
structure defines values, and values strengthen social 
structure. The question here is whether or not aesthetic 
values are related to social structure in the same way as 
are such other kinds of values. We are often led by society 
into a sort of unconscious assimilation of certain standards. 
we often accept ideas and values of the society without 
questioning. As children, we accept the values of our role 
models, or "significant others• as sociologists would say, 
before we understand why it is important to accept certain 
values. Later in life, we may seriously question many of 
our values, but many of them may go unquestioned. The 
point is that we are quite accustomed to the process of 
accepting something before we understand the value of 
whatever it is that we have accepted. Thus, many of us 
subscribe to certain values without knowing why we have 
done so. Now, if it is the case that aesthetic values are 
somehow embedded in the network of social values, is an 
appeal to the values of the society any more valid than an 
appeal to authority? 
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Generally speaking, •good• and •bad• are evaluative 
terms which have little meaning unless certain conditions 
are met. First of all, the concept of •good• has no meaning 
in the absence of the concept of •bad,• each has its meaning 
only in relation to the other. Secondly, in many cases 
•good• and •bad• have little use-value outside of a relationship 
with some specific standard. Often, something is either 
•good• or "bad" in relation to some purpose which it serves 
or facilitates. We typically assess the value of a tool in 
terms of usefulness, durability, and even how comfortably 
the tool fits our hands. How well the tool facilitates the 
realization of the purpose for which it was designed is its 
measure of value. The design, durability, and grip of the 
tool are all the things which contribute to its usefulness. 
Perhaps there is a useful analogy to be made between the 
evaluation of such things as tools and the evaluation of 
art. Can we say that one saw has a greater value than 
another {perhaps a greater value to one who wants to purchase 
a saw) because it has been proven to be more durable? 
Well, it is one reason for supposing that it may be better: 
but what good is a durable saw which does not perform well? 
Even though •durability• functions as a criterion of excellence 
for the evaluation of tools, it is not a necessary nor 
sufficient one to justify that value judgement. All of 
those things which facilitate the desired performance of a 
tool are, as they stand alone, conditions of or contributors 
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to excellence. None of these qualities, i.e., durability, 
grip, design, are sufficient justification for excellence 
as they stand alone. The standard(s) by which the tool is 
ultimately measured, namely those factors which facilitate 
the realization of the purpose for which the tool was 
designed (hereafter referred to as "usefulness•), is really 
a composition of many standards. 
Another question which is brought about by the 
consideration of the tool is whether or not it makes any 
sense to say something like, "a good hammer is a better 
tool than a good saw." Since both of these tools serve 
very different purposes, such a statement seems to be 
absurd. However, because both the hammer and the saw are 
tools, they are both evaluated in terms of "usefulness.• 
What it is that we mean by "usefulness" changes depending 
upon which tool we are evaluating, but the general concept 
of "usefulness" does not. Value judgements about art, like 
tools, cannot be justified by an appeal to a single standard, 
unless what we mean by a •single standard" is a composition 
of standards. The question we should be asking at this 
point is whether or not there is something which applies to 
the evaluation of art in the way that •usefulness• applies 
to the evaluation of tools. There may be a way in which 
•usefulness• in regard to tools may be analgous to aesthetic 
experience in regard to art. 
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II. THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE 
I have already briefly discussed several different 
contexts in which we may speak of the aesthetic experiencer 
namely the "aesthetic responser" the "aesthetic reaction,• 
the •pre-critical responser• and the •critical response.• 
What I would like to consider now is the distinction to be 
made between a response and an aesthetic response to an 
object. Firstlyr it is generally accepted that aesthetic 
responses (or experiences) can be elicted from things 
which are not works of art. The Grand Canyonr for exampler 
has often been the source of many an aesthetic response. 
Secondlyr not all responses to the work of art are of the 
aesthetic varietyr even among works which are assumed to be 
capable of invoking such responses. I do not believe that 
we want to approach this matter with the assumption that 
the aesthetic response to the work of art is somehow very 
different in nature from the aesthetic response to the 
things which are not considered to be works of art. Perhaps 
works of art provide a greater variety of such responsesr 
and so onr but I think we can safely proceed with the 
notion in mind that an aesthetic response is an aesthetic 
responser regardless of its object. At what level(s) does 
the response to or experience of art differ from other 
kinds of experience. The answer to the question, though 
not very helpful, is, quite simply, at the aesthetic level. 
What differentiates the aesthetic level of experience from 
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the general flow of experience may have something to do 
with the way in which "self-consciousness" is related to 
both the aesthetic and general flow of experience. 
In an effort to differentiate the aesthetic experience 
from the general flow of experience, Dorothy Walsh suggests 
that there is a •duality of self-reflexive awareness" and 
suggests, wrongly I think, that this duality is inherent 
in the aesthetic experience. This duality, according to 
Walsh, is characteristic of "an experience,• a category of 
experience which art (though not only art) offers us. The 
experience of which she speaks is "self-consciously recognized 
by the experiencer as his. An experience is not just 
awareness; it is awareness of awareness." She goes on to 
say that "An awareness of awareness is both an awareness of 
something given in experience, and also an awareness of a 
mode or manner of experiencing it; in short, it is a 
'me-experiencing this' n 6 Now, in considseration of the 
fact that the purpose of Walsh's essay concerns the single 
question, "What kind of knowledge, if any, does literary 
art afford?," I do not wish to criticize her suggestion 
here. However, her suggestion may serve to help illuminate 
my theory of how the aesthetic experience differs from 
other experiences. 
What I hold as being an aesthetic experience is directly 
opposed to Walsh's idea of •an experience.• An aesthetic 
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experience is better characterized by a lack of awareness 
of awareness, if you will. It is a state of mind character-
ized by the fact that as soon as one becomes aware that he 
is in this state, he no longer is. To be aware of the fact 
that one is aware of something presupposes a distance 
between the experiencer and his experience of whatever it 
is that is being observed. For example, when a man is 
aware that he is aware of a tree, he sees both himself and 
the tree as being distinct from one another. This distinctness 
is what is meant by "distance." Through awareness of this 
distance comes a state of mind in which the experiencer is 
both aware of the experience of the tree and aware of the 
experience of himself as distinct from the tree, as that 
which is observing the tree. Thus, it is in this sense 
that we may speak of a distance between the experiencer 
and his experience. There is no disputing the fact that 
there is a physical distance between the brain and other 
objects in the world such as trees, but need there be a 
distance between the mind of a person and the mind's experience 
of something like a tree? That is, the experiencer and his 
experience. The aesthetic experience is a level of experience 
which transcends the boundaries of self-awareness in such a 
way that at the moment or moments of its existence, the 
experiencer is not able to step back from one awareness or 
call into play a second awareness which is somehow conscious 
of the experience taking place. To put it poetically, the 
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observer, the object which invokes the experience, and the 
experience itself become one. At the inception of awareness 
of awareness, the aesthetic experience ceases to exist. 
The preceding is an account of the structure of an aesthetic 
experience, but it must be kept in mind that this structure 
is not peculiar to the aesthetic experience. 
Someone may wish to suggest at this point that there 
are two kinds of aesthetic experiences, one being character-
ized by the lack of awareness (let us say an •immersed• 
aesthetic experience), and another being characterized by 
an awareness of awareness (a "self-conscious• aesthetic 
experience). Is it possible for an aesthetic experience to 
happen during the state of mind characterized by an awareness 
of awareness? I shall argue that because an awareness of 
awareness presupposes a stepping back from experience in 
certain senses, the intensity of the awareness which is 
under the eye of the other awareness, so to speak, is 
diminshed. Let us begin with a consideration of the awareness 
which is aware of another awareness (hereafter referred to 
as the first awareness). Similarly, we shall refer to the 
awareness which the first awareness is aware of as the 
second awareness. Now, what is characteristic of the first 
awareness is a state of mind which is analytical, oriented 
toward comparison, and even sometimes judgemental, at least 
we will say that the first awareness is capable of being 
such states of mind. The first awareness is doing the 
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"looking• whereas the second awareness is being "looked" 
at, though the second awareness is also "looking" at something. 
However, the second awareness is not "looking• at the 
first awareness. If what the second awareness is "looking• 
at is an object, e.g. a tree, the second awareness is 
experiencing the object where the first awareness is 
experiencing the experience of analyzing or "looking at• the 
•experience• of the second awareness, to put it awkwardly. 
Thus, as it is, there are two experiences taking place 
simultaneously. 
Is this first awareness, then, a rational state of 
mind? It is not the case that the first awareness is 
always judging, comparing and so forth, but I shall hold 
that it is a rational state of mind of sorts. Let us 
suppose that the object of our experience is a car. The 
•immersed" state of mind and the •self-conscious• state of 
mind will experience the car in very different ways. The 
"immersed• experience of the car is one in which the shape, 
color, and lines of the car are the only kinds of features 
which one is aware of. In this state of mind, the experiencer 
is not aware that the car is a Honda, or that it is two 
years old, or that it may be a desirable thing to purchase. 
The "self-conscious" state of mind is aware of the color, 
shape, and lines of the car, but it is also aware of the 
car in ways that the •immersed" state of mind cannot be. 
The "self-conscious• mind sees the car as a good buy, as 
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L____ 
an object which may enhance his prestige, as a 1985 Honda, 
and so on. In short, we might say that the •self-conscious" 
state of mind which is aware of the car sees the car in 
terms of some kind of meaning, whereas the "immersed• state 
of mind which is aware of the car does not. Someone may 
question whether or not a person who has never seen a car 
or even heard of its existence, such as a native, would 
experience the car in an "immersed• sense. Such a native 
would have a "self-conscious" experience of the car since 
he would in all likelihood attempt to make sense of it, to 
see it in terms of some kind of meaning. 
The second awareness is akin to the "immersed" awareness 
in that it too is aware only of the appearance of the car, 
e.g. color, shape, and not of any meaning which the car may 
hold. But the first awareness attempts to find meaning in 
the object of the experience of the second awareness, 
thereby diffusing the would be •immersed awareness" into 
two separate awarenesses. Thus, the •aesthetic" intensity 
of the first awareness, i.e. of the experience of the 
second awareness, is less by comparison than the intensity 
of the •immersed" experience. The "immersed• awareness is 
not able to experience anything in terms of meaning because 
it is not aware of its object of experience as being either 
distinct or related to anything else in any way other than 
a physical sense, i.e., a tree is seen against some sort of 
background and a musical note may be heard against the 
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background of silence and as it relates in pitch or tonal 
quality to other musical notes. In the •immersed• awareness 
of an object, there is no •distance• between the experience 
and the object of the experience, or between the experiencer 
and the experience. In the "self-conscious• awareness of an 
object, there is a "distance• between the experience and 
the object of the experience, and between the experiencer 
and the experience. In the absence of •distance," the 
experiencer is not able to see the object of the experience 
in terms of any meaning. The visual appearance, sound, or 
even texture of an object (which are the aspects of any object 
that the •immersed• awareness is aware of) have no meaning 
in the sense in which I use "meaning." An object has 
meaning only as it relates to something other than the 
object such as a purpose, value, desire, another object, or 
whatever. 
The aesthetic experience somehow transcends, or perhaps 
bypasses, the state of mind which experiences objects in 
terms of meaning. To this degree, at least, I must contend 
that the "immersed" awareness, or the immersed structure of 
mind, is a necessary precondition for the inception of the 
aesthetic experience. However, I have also suggested that 
objects other than works of art may be experienced in the 
•immersed• sense. Thus, we are left with the question of 
how the aesthetic experience differs from the general lot 
of •immersed• experiences. I do not intend to take up this 
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question here, for it is not necessary that I do so in 
order to proceed with my point. If the quality of the aesthetic 
experience is what effects the aesthetic value of a work of 
art, and if the aesthetic experience must necessarily be 
appealed to in the making of aesthetic judgements (even 
though qualities or properties of the artwork may in some 
manner also be appealed to), then it may be misleading for 
us to assign aesthetic value (in relation to some sense 
of •good" or "bad•) to works of art because of the 
0 meaninglessness• associated with the aesthetic experience. 
For, if the aesthetic experience, as an •immersed" experience, 
is an experience devoid of "meaning,• then the aesthetic 
experience should not be evaluated in terms of the realm of 
positive and negative values. This is not to suggest that 
the aesthetic experience should not be evaluated at all, 
only that aesthetic experiences should not be evaluated in 
such a way that our evaluations result in such conclusions 
as, •this aesthetic experience has more aesthetic value 
than that one.° Further, if the aesthetic value of the work 
of art is ultimately in part a function of the aesthetic 
experience, or if the aesthetic value of the work of art is 
to be assessed through the aesthetic value of the aesthetic 
experience, then it stands to reason (or so the argument 
contends) that the work of art should not be evaluated in 
such a way that will yield conclusions such as, •this work 
of art has more aesthetic value than that one.• 
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The crucial premiss of this argument is that aesthetic 
experiences are devoid of •meaning.• Now, it may be suggested 
that the aesthetic experience is devoid of •meaning• during 
the moments of its existence, but that it has a •meaning• 
when it is reflected upon. For "meaning,• in terms of the 
aesthetic experience, is, as I have defined here, something 
which comes about when the object of the experience is seen 
in relation to something other than the object. Thus, the 
reflected-upon aesthetic experience has "meaning• in that 
it may be seen as related to many other things. However, 
this "meaning,• whatever it is, which is assessed through 
the reflecting upon an aesthetic experience is superimposed 
upon the aesthetic experience by the reflecting experiencer. 
The "meaning" is not inherent in the aesthetic experience, 
it is "brought to" the aesthetic experience as opposed to 
•extracted from" the experience, if you will. Thus, it may 
be said that the realm of meanings are applicable to the 
reflected upon aesthetic experience, but not to the aesthetic 
experience itself. And, it is the aesthetic experience, 
not the reflected-upon aesthetic experience, which lies 
closest to the work of art. The underlying point here is 
that of the following two ratios, the first is greater than 
the second: the ratio of (the degree to which the observer 
determines the nature of the reflected-upon aesthetic 
experience) to (the degree to which the artwork determines 
the reflected upon aesthetic experience) is greater than 
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the ratio of (the degree to which the observer determines 
the aesthetic experience) to (the degree to which the 
artwork determines the aesthetic experience). 
Given the argument of the last two pages, it may well 
turn out to be the case that to ask whether or not a particular 
work of art is •good• or "bad" is as pointless as it is to 
ask whether or not the color red is •good." It may even 
turn out that we are somehow underininirig the very purpose 
or significance of the work of art by our attempts at 
evaluations in terms of aesthetic excellence. In any case, 
the conception of •good• and •baa• may be incompatible, 
perhaps incommensurable, with the experience of art. This 
is not to suggest that the task of evaluating art is without 
purpose, for it expands our ability to appreciate works of 
art and raises other questions and problems which may have 
otherwise gone unnoticed. What I suggest is that the 
significance which may come from the consideration of the 
work of art -- the "evaluation• of it, if you will may 
have more to do with the communication of different per-
spectives and interpretations than with the attainment of 
an aesthetic judgement, i.e. some true claim about the 
artwork meeting criteria of excellence. The possibility 
that such an attainment is impossible should in no way 
deter us in philosophy from serious consideration of the 
aesthetic judgement, however, for its consideration contributes 
to an understanding and appreciation of the variety of 
experiences which art may bring to us. 
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In summary, consideration of the distinction between 
the aesthetic experience and the reflected-upon aesthetic 
experience points to the understanding that there is a 
•meaninglessness• characteristic of the aesthetic experience. 
This "meaninglessness" is precisely that which obstructs 
the possibility of assigning to the work of art an aesthetic 
value in terms of merit. This is by no means to suggest 
that works of art may not be assignesd a value of any sort, 
for there are moral, political, nationalistic, and a host 
of other standards by which the work of art may be measured. 
However, the judgements which might result from such evaluations 
would not fall under th peculiar category of the •aesthetic.• 
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1 Monroe Beardsley, "Tastes Can Be Disputed," Classical 
Philosophical Questions, fourth ed., ed., James A. Gould (Columbus, 
Ohio: Merrill Publishing Co., 1982), p. 602. 
2 Monroe Beardsley, "The Classification of Critical Reason," 
A Modern Book of Esthetics, ed., Melvin Rader (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart, and Winston, 1979), p. 394. 
3 Melvin Rader, ed., A Modern Book of Esthetics, fifth ed. 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1979), p. 384. 
4 Beardsley, op. cit. p. 394. 
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6 Dorothy Walsh, "Enhancement of Experience," ~Modern Book 
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